Abstract
Introduction
Chile's dramatic increase in income over the last 20 years has been matched by an equally dramatic reduction in poverty: while GDP per capita increased from US$ 1,679 in 1987 to US$ 7,214 in 2006, 1 the proportion of Chileans living below official poverty lines fell from 39.4% to 13.7% (Figure 1 ). Although economy-wide growth explains much of the reduction in poverty rates in the past (Larrañaga 1994 , Contreras 2003 , a series of cash and in-kind transfers from the government to poor households also proved to be fundamental to poverty alleviation (Beyer 1997 , Valdés 1999 . 2 Cowen and De Gregorio (1996) argue that even though a one percentage point increase in growth rates was associated with a 0.4 percentage point reduction in poverty between 1990 and 1994, it is difficult to separate the pure effect of growth from the impact of government transfers because social policy affects economic growth. 3 Chile is comprised of 13 administrative regions. Each has a formal name and a Roman numeral, the latter generally used. The numbers are assigned sequentially from north to south, with the exception of Region XIII (the Santiago Metropolitan Region), which is located between Regions V and VI. Each region consists of multiple provinces, which are further divided into 342 communes, i.e., counties. Each county has its own government except Antártica, which is governed by Cabo de Hornos County. In this paper, we focus on the remaining 341 independent counties. decline in the sugar beet industry (Government of Araucanía 2007). Such variation in economic and geographic conditions implies that there exists a wide distribution of poverty within regions, and uncovering this distribution may have important consequences for the design of social policy.
Unfortunately, the Chilean census does not include income data, and no survey with detailed income data is representative below the regional level in Chile. Thus, Contreras (1996 Contreras ( , 2001 ), Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle (1997) , Feres (2000) , Pizzolito (2005a Pizzolito ( , 2005b , and others who have studied poverty and income distribution in Chile have restricted their analyses to the national and regional levels, where estimates of income are statistically reliable. However, recent developments in methodologies for combining survey and census data now enable the estimation of statistically-reliable measures of poverty at the sub-regional level. 4 In this paper, we employ the poverty-mapping methodologies formalized by Elbers, et al. (2003) to assess the impact of cash transfers on poverty rates at the county level, two administrative units below the regional level. We find that cash transfers result in economicallyand statistically-significant reductions in county-level poverty rates across Chile. However, the estimated reductions in headcount ratios range from 5.1% to 67.8%, indicating that there is considerable variation in the effectiveness of cash transfers in bringing people out of poverty. To better understand this variation, we also explore the interplay between transfers and geography.
We find that the greatest reductions in poverty occur in rural areas, although urban concentration and topography both appear to influence the effectiveness of cash transfers on poverty within regions, suggesting that geographic considerations may be useful for improving targeting performance. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions described by Besley 4 Hentschel, et al. (1999) estimate geographically-disaggregated poverty rates in Ecuador by imputing income from survey data for every individual in the census. Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) improve upon these povertymapping methods by incorporating errors from the first stage to obtain more precise estimates of income. These methods have been applied to South Africa (Demombynes and Özler 2006) and Cambodia, Ecuador, and Madagascar (Elbers, et al. 2007) , and elsewhere.
and Kanbur (1990) and with empirical evidence from Cambodia, Ecuador, and Madagascar reported by Elbers, et al. (2007) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of the poverty mapping methodology proposed by Elbers, et al. (2003) and discusses its implementation in the Chilean context; section 3 describes government programs for poverty reduction in Chile, including the various subsidies available to poor households; section 4 describes the data used in the analysis; section 5 presents the empirical results; and section 6 concludes.
Methodology
The methodology proposed by Hentschel, et al. (2000) and developed by Elbers, et al. (2003) takes advantage of the detailed data in household surveys and the universal coverage of censuses. The intuition is conceptually straightforward: household income is estimated using survey data, restricting the explanatory variables to those available in both the survey and a census from a similar point in time. These parameters are then used to estimate income for the entire population based on the census data. Finally, poverty indicators are estimated for geographic areas for which the census is representative but for which the survey is not.
The execution of the method is somewhat more complicated. We provide a brief overview here and a detailed accounting in Appendix 1; readers who are interested in the complete statistical properties of the estimators are referred to Elbers, et al. (2003) . First, a detailed household survey is used to estimate the joint distribution of household income and a vector of explanatory variables. Restricting the set of explanatory variables to those available in the census, these "first stage" estimates are then used to generate the distribution of income for any subgroup of the population, conditioning on the observed characteristics of that subgroup.
The simplest means of estimating the model is via a linear approximation of the conditional expectation, allowing geographic effects and heteroskedasticity in the distribution of the error term. It is important to note that the cluster component of the residual can significantly reduce the power of the estimates in the second stage, so it is important to explain the variation in income due to location via observable variables to the greatest extent possible; stepwise regression is therefore used to derive the best-fitting specification for each of Chile's 13 regions independently. 
Public Policy for Poverty Reduction in Chile
Beginning in the early 1980s, the government adopted a wide-ranging set of policies to reduce poverty. Central to the government's anti-poverty policy was the development of a standardized metric to identify poor households. The "CAS Card" (revised and renamed the "CAS-2 Card" in 1987) is administered by the county at the household's request; it evaluates poverty on the basis of self-reported income and housing criteria, particularly construction materials, density, and access to potable water. A score is assigned to the household and remains valid for three years, at which point a re-evaluation may be requested.
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The CAS Card became the primary data point for setting government priorities in the provision of public housing, with the concentration of poor households in any given region in 1982 and 1992 directly influencing the allocation of housing subsidies over the subsequent decade (Soto and Torche 2004) . Between 1990 and 2000, housing subsidies increased at an average rate of 10% per year in real terms, and poor neighborhoods received additional subsidies 5 There are no significant gains in efficiency by further increasing the number of repetitions. 6 Soto and Torche (2004) provide additional details on the CAS form and the classification of poor households.
to develop public sewerage and electric systems on the basis of these criteria. These criteria were also used to identify indigent households eligible for receiving direct cash transfers.
Government subsidies to poor households fall into five main programs:
1. Family Subsidy (SUF): A subsidy provided to pregnant women, parents with children not covered by social security, and parents or guardians of persons with physical disabilities. Eligibility is determined by the CAS-2 Card. This program is administered by individual counties, but the budget is assigned by the regional governments according to the distribution of CAS-2 Card scores in each county. The benefit was CH$ 4,126 per month 7 per recipient in 2003, and it is indexed to inflation.
2. Assistance Pensions (PASIS): Pensions provided for adults aged 65 and over, physicallydisabled adults, and mentally-disabled individuals regardless of age who have a total income below half of the minimum pension allowance. 8 These transfers are only available to individuals who have at least three continuous years of residency in Chile and who do not receive any other pensions. The regional government evaluates households for eligibility based on the CAS-2 Card score; however, because the number of subsidies available to each region is fixed by the Social Security Commission, the cutoff score varies by region (and, potentially, by county). In 2003, the benefit totaled CH$ 45,091 per month for the physically disabled and twice that amount for the mentally disabled; it, too, is indexed to inflation.
3. Chile Solidario: A program that includes both cash and counseling services for indigent and high-risk households, particularly those with female heads. Eligibility is determined by the CAS-2 Card. During the first phase of the program, beneficiaries receive a monthly payment that decreases from CH$ 10,500 to CH$ 4,126 over 24 months (2003 rates), conditional on frequent meetings with counselors to learn budgeting, goal-setting, and employment skills; counselors also offer guidance on other support programs for which the household may be eligible. After two years, beneficiaries who have successfully completed the counseling program are automatically enrolled in the SUF program for up to 36 months.
Water and Sewage Subsidy (SAP):
A three-year, renewable subsidy to offset the cost of water among poor households. Eligibility is determined by the CAS-2 Card. Although the program is administered by the county government, the Ministry of Finance sets the budget available to each region and regional governments set the number of subsidies available to each county; as such, the cut-off score may vary by county. This subsidy covers between 20% and 85% of the cost of water for up to 15 cubic meters per month; it is paid directly to water providers and discounted from the water bills of beneficiaries.
5. Unemployment: A decreasing monthly payment for up to 12 months for individuals who lost work through no fault of their own. Eligibility is based on formal employment for at least 52 weeks during the previous two years 9 and not having rejected job opportunities offered by the National Training and Employment Service or the county government. Although the CAS-2 Card is not used to assign this subsidy, it is designed with the intention of preventing households from falling into poverty as a result of employment shocks. In 2003, the benefit was CH$ 17,338 the first 3 months, decreasing to CH$ 11,560 for the next three months and to CH$ 8,669 the last 6 months of eligibility. Table 1 Water and Sewage Subsidy is allocated to almost 16% of households, and it is particularly prevalent in the arid north of Chile (Regions I, II, III, and IV) and in Region XI. Unlike many other subsidies, the value of the Water and Sewage Subsidy varies by region, with beneficiaries in Regions I, II, and XI receiving far greater subsidies than households elsewhere, reflecting the cost of purchasing and transporting water in these areas.
10
Weighting household subsidies by the mean number of household members in each region, the total expected monthly value of all subsidies for a representative person ranges from CH$ 966 in Region XIII to CH$ 3,595 in Region XI; the national average is CH$ 1,708.
According to Chilean law, taxes cannot be tied to individual expenditures, so there is no specific financing for cash transfers to poor households. Therefore, transfers are financed out of total tax revenues. In 2003, 51.6% of total tax revenues came from the Value Added Tax, 27.4% from income taxes, 12.1% from excise taxes, 4.5% from tariffs, and 4.4% from transaction taxes. Figure 2 shows the distribution of average transfers by type by pre-transfer income decile.
As the figure suggests, cash transfers have good targeting on average. Nevertheless, the top half of the income distribution receives a significant share of transfers, including transfers for which such households are technically ineligible. Thus, there is considerable room for improvement in targeting.
Data
The survey employed to impute income as described above is the November 2003
Characterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN), administered by the University of Chile on behalf of the Ministry of Planning. The survey utilizes multistage random sampling with regional stratification and clustering. In the first stage, the country is divided between rural and urban areas for each of the 13 regions, and the primary sampling units are selected according to a probability sample based on the 2002 census. Within each sampling unit, households are selected with equal probability. Elbers, et al. (2003) , a set of variables common to both the CASEN and census is used to impute income. Although some explanatory variables are defined identically in both data sets, others were constructed; in such cases, the means and variances of the explanatory variables were evaluated to ensure that they are identically defined. Using stepwise regression to detect the best fit for rural and urban households in each region separately, we determined that household demographics (e.g., the number of household members; the share of young children in the household), characteristics of the household head (e.g., gender; education level; ethnicity), characteristics of the house itself (e.g., number of rooms; construction material; type of flooring; water source; sewerage), and asset ownership (e.g., washing machine; water heater; fixed telephone; cellular phone; satellite or cable television; microwave; computer; Internet access) were the strongest predictors of household income. Estimates also included location dummies to capture latent cluster-level effects. The predictive ability of the model is high for cross-sectional data, with R 2 values ranging between 0.28 and 0.54 (Agostini, et al. 2007 ).
Empirical Results
Using the coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix estimated as described above, we calculate poverty rates in each of Chile's 342 counties. Because Chile's rural and urban poverty lines differ, headcount ratios are estimated separately for rural and urban households, and a weighted average of the rural and urban poverty rates is reported. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the estimates and Figures 3 through 6 illustrate these estimates graphically.
In each figure, the left and right panels depict the estimated headcount ratio prior to the receipt of cash transfers from the government and after the receipt of transfers, respectively. Darker shading indicates higher poverty rates within the county. Pre-transfer estimates of poverty range from 1.6% in the Santiago suburb of Vitacura to 54.3% in Pemuco (Region VIII); post-transfer estimates of poverty vary from 1.4% in Vitacura to 48.7% in Los Álamos County (Region VIII).
Poverty in Chile displays strong regional patterns. For example, poverty rates before the receipt of cash transfers are generally lowest in counties in Regions II and XII, both of which are rich in natural resources. By contrast, the median pre-transfer poverty rate is highest for Regions IV, VIII, and IX, which are largely dependent on agriculture for income. Just over 25% of the people in the largely urban counties of Regions V and XIII live below the poverty line. Countylevel variation in poverty rates is greatest in Regions XII and XIII and lowest in Region VI.
The Chilean Constitution stipulates that taxes cannot be directly tied to expenditures, so cash transfers for poverty reduction are financed out of total tax revenues. Because Chile's value added tax contributes over half of the country's tax revenue and because income tax data are not made available by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service, it is difficult to assess the tax burden of individual households, and thus the impact of taxes on poverty. It may therefore be the case that taxes exacerbate poverty. Indeed, inasmuch as consumption taxes are regressive, our estimates of the impact of cash transfers may be biased upward given the lack of information about financing. 14 Nevertheless, there exists tremendous heterogeneity in poverty within regions, even if headcount ratios in poor areas are overstated.
Cash transfers to poor households have a profound impact on poverty rates in Regions I, IV, VII, VIII, and IX, where transfers induce a 17.3% reduction in the share of the population living in poverty in the median county. These effects are greater still in Regions X, XI, and XII, where the median county sees a 23.0% reduction in poverty from transfers. By contrast, cash transfers have a modest impact on the median headcount ratio in Regions II, V, and XIII. Still, the variance of the distribution of the estimated impact is high in Regions II, XI, and XII, suggesting that the effect of cash transfers varies widely even in regions where the median effect is comparatively high or comparatively low.
To examine the overall impact of cash transfers on poverty more formally, we also estimate the non-parametric density of the county-level headcount ratios before and after cash transfers using the Epanechnikov Kernel estimator. As Figure 7 shows, cash transfers shift the distribution of headcount ratios to the left, implying that cash transfers are effective in reducing poverty. Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions formally rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions come from the same data-generating process at the 99% confidence level. MOUNTAIN and VALLEY are dummy variables for whether the county lies above 1500 meters in elevation and whether the county is principally located in Chile's Central Valley, respectively, and RAIN is a dummy indicating that the county experiences extreme rainfall (i.e., locales that receive less than 200 mm of rain per year and those that receive less than more than 1,750 mm of rain per year). These controls are important because the housing criteria included in the CAS-2
Card assessment of poverty differ across climactic zones. REGION is a vector of dummies that account for variation in the budgets received from the central government, for the ability of regional governments to efficiently allocate funding for poverty relief to counties, and for other 16 Indeed, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of the reduction in headcount ratios is the same for rural and urban areas. 17 For robustness, we also estimate this equation using the absolute change in headcount ratios at the dependent variable, controlling for pre-transfer headcount ratios. These estimates are similar to those reported below.
forms of unobserved heterogeneity that is common to all counties within the region. We further interact the region dummies with the urban share variable to estimate the impact of heterogeneity in urban concentration within regions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are bootstrapped 1,000 times to account for the fact that the dependent variable is estimated.
Because we cannot estimate a structural model that simultaneously determines poverty, transfers, and targeting, regression results should be interpreted as conditional correlations rather than causal determinants of the impact of cash transfers on poverty. In particular, we do not have data that allow us to explicitly evaluate local institutions (e.g., the ability of county governments to identify poor households) that may influence poverty rates. Nevertheless, the regressors explain a large fraction of the variance in the county data, with an R 2 of 0.96.
A higher share in the urban population is associated with lower reductions in poverty in all 13 regions of Chile (Figure 3 , Column 1). However, this effect varies widely by region: a one percentage point increase in the share of the urban population is associated with a 0.06% reduction in the change in headcount ratio derived from cash transfers in Region XIII (the omitted category) and a 0.27% reduction in Region XI. The effectiveness of cash transfers in reducing urban poverty especially lags behind that of rural poverty in counties in Regions II, III, X, XI, and XII. This result presents a more nuanced picture of poverty reduction than the regional estimates presented in Table 2 , and suggests that it is insufficient to merely target rural poverty, urban poverty, or regional poverty, and that it is instead preferable to target rural or urban poverty within regions.
Conditioning on urban concentration, the results further show that transfers are correlated with a greater impact on poverty in more populous areas and in mountainous areas. By contrast, the effect of transfers on poverty is lower in Chile's Central Valley and in areas with extreme rainfall. As with the share of the population living in urban areas, the influences of topography, population density, and weather may differ by region. To begin to account for this possibility, we also interact region dummies with dummies for living in mountainous communities (Column 2). 18 Indeed, we find that cash transfers are correlated with reduced poverty in mountainous areas in Regions I, II, III, VIII, XI, and XIII, but that mountainous areas appear to impede poverty reduction appears in Region VII. These results again suggest that efficiency gains in targeting poverty may be made from accounting for variation within regions.
Discussion and Conclusion
Since the early 1980s, the Chilean government has made poverty reduction an important policy objective. By the early part of this decade, Chile's antipoverty strategy had become exemplified by a series of transfers provided to pregnant women, poor parents, female heads of household, the elderly, the handicapped, the unemployed, the indigent, and those unable to purchase sufficient drinking water. Such transfers made a significant contribution to the 65% decline in poverty rates over the last 20 years.
While the national poverty rate was estimated to be 18.7% in 2003, the CASEN survey demonstrated considerable heterogeneneity in poverty rates across regions. These disparities have influenced public policy, including the allocation of budgets for antipoverty programs.
However, estimates of poverty at the regional level obscure the enormous variation in poverty rates within regions. Yet because the CASEN is not representative at the sub-regional level, scholars have not been able to accurately analyze poverty at the sub-regional level.
To better understand inter-regional differences in the effectiveness of transfers in poverty reduction, we employ poverty-mapping methodologies to assess the impact of cash transfers at the county level. Using nonparametric analysis and kernel estimation, we find a high level of heterogeneity in the extent to which transfers reduce poverty within each region. We also find sizable differences in poverty reduction between rural and urban areas. To further explore the interplay between transfers, poverty, and geography, we use regression analysis to show that the conditional impact of urban concentration on poverty reduction varies by as much as 350%
between regions. The effect of topography also varies tremendously by region.
For policymakers and scholars alike, it would be interesting to know the reasons underlying the wide disparities in the extent to which cash transfers reduce poverty within regions. One possibility is that the depth of poverty differs across communities and that relatively uniform transfers fail to reduce headcount ratios in some areas. Alternatively, it may be that the CAS-2 Card fails to identify some poor households. 19 Third, the geographic distribution of the poor within communities may make targeting more or less difficult. Finally, it may be that institutional failures and/or elite capture of resources prevent transfers from reaching poor households even when they are correctly identified. Each of these possibilities remains an important topic of further research.
Even if the reasons underlying differences in the effectiveness of cash transfer are not well understood, however, it would be possible to evaluate the efficiency of targeting at the county level as opposed to the regional level. Such analyses would be timely because Chile realized a budget surplus totaling 7.9% of GDP in 2006 and 5.3% of GDP in the first half of 19 Indeed, the government has already taken important steps to better target the poor by replacing the CAS-2 card with the "Social Protection Card" (SPC) in April 2007. The SPC uses income stability, educational level, labor experience, age structure, disabilities, health status, housing ownership, crowding, urban/rural location, and regional unemployment levels to identify poor households.
2007, and the government has proposed allocating part of the surplus for additional poverty relief.
As we have shown in this paper, including urban concentration, topography, and other geographic considerations within regions is likely to facilitate greater poverty reductions than targeting by region alone.
Appendix 1
This Appendix provides a brief overview of the methodology proposed by Hentschel, et al. (2000) and developed by Elbers, et al. (2003) . In the first stage, a model is created that relates the income per capita of household h (Y h ) in cluster c with a group of observable characteristics
where the error vector u is distributed F(0,∑). To allow correlation within each cluster, the error term is further assumed to consist of a cluster component (η) and an idiosyncratic error (ε): The upper and lower limits, A and B, can be estimated together with the parameter α using the standard pseudo-maximum likelihood; the advantage of this approach is that it eliminates impossible values for the predicted variances. 20 The subindex "." in the equation represents the average over the index.
The simplest means of estimating the model is to use a linear approximation of the conditional expectation, allowing geographic effects and heteroskedasticity into the distribution of the error term. It is important to note that the cluster component of the residual can significantly reduce the power of the estimates in the second stage, and that it is thus important to explain the variation in income or consumption due to location via observable variables to the greatest extent possible. 
This conditional expected value is generally impossible to resolve analytically, making it necessary to use Monte Carlo simulations to obtain an estimator, E c G .
One complication associated with this methodology is calculating the correct standard errors, which is not trivial. Because it is not possible to calculate them analytically, the methodology again resorts to bootstrapping techniques and Monte Carlo simulations.
Suppressing the subscripts, the difference between the estimator of the expected value of G, E c G , and the actual level of the poverty indicator for the geographic area can be decomposed into:
The prediction error thus has three components: the first is due to the presence of a stochastic error in the first stage model, implying that the actual household incomes deviate from their expected values (idiosyncratic error); the second is due to the variance in the estimators of the parameters of the model from the first stage (model error); and the third is due to the use of an inexact method to calculate c Ĝ (computation error).
The variance of the estimator due to the idiosyncratic error shrinks proportionally with the population in each geographic area. Thus, smaller populations within each geographic area are associated with larger idiosyncratic errors, introducing a limit to the extent of disaggregation that may be achieved. The variance of the estimator due to the model error can be calculated using the delta method: The first type of adjustment made by ECLAC is related to non-response and invalid answers. In particular, ECLAC makes adjustments in three cases: people who declare themselves as employed but who do not report income from their main occupation; people who declared themselves to be retired or living on a pension but who do not report the amount of the pension; and households living in owner-occupied housing but who do not report a rental value.
In the first and second case, ECLAC imputes the value of the mean income for each person based on family relationship, gender, educational attainment, occupation, type of economic activity, and region of residence. In the third case, ECLAC imputes an implicit rental value using the "hot deck" technique, wherein the data set is ordered geographically and households are selected based on the housing tenancy, the type of housing, and other household characteristics. By contrast, when households report a positive value for imputed rent despite not being owners, the value reported is subtracted from the household income.
ECLAC also adjusts for under-and over-reporting of some types of income. The procedure basically consists in adjusting income from specific sources to match corresponding values in the National Accounts System of the Central Bank of Chile's Households and Expenditures Account.
To do this, the data from National Accounts is converted to match the income categories included in the CASEN. Then, the total values for each specific income category are compared to those in the CASEN. Finally, the proportional differences for each income category are imputed uniformly to each individual receiving income in the CASEN. There are two exceptions to this last step: adjustments to capital income are made only to the top quintile of households, and income from transfers and gifts are not adjusted at all. No county in Region XII is situated above 1,500 meters Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
